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INTRODUCTION 
  Good grief, Charley Brown! After almost 50 years of publication, you are not a going 
concern but a mere extension of Charles Schultz. Who really cares whether Peanuts, a profitable 
business for almost half a century is really a separate on-going entity or, as it turns out, not a 
separate entity but merely an extension of its creator, Charles Schultz?  As recently as six months 
ago, it would have met the traditional definitional requirement for a going concern; it could be 
expected to continue in operation into the foreseeable future.  That going concern definition, 
however, does not take into consideration whether a current on-going business exists that is 
separate from the owner/manager, or as was the case with Peanuts, whether the business is 
merely an extension of a self-employed person.  In essence, it muddles the entity issue. 
This current GAAP determination of a going concern is shortsighted for two important 
reasons.  The most important deals with creditors and other stakeholders involved with the 
business.   Do they enter into contracts with the business or with the individual owner/manager?  
Currently, they contract with both since, in reality, they make no determination whether a 
separate firm (entity) exists.  The second deals with valuing a business.  If the business is not 
really a separate going concern, it would typically be valued as the sum of its individual assets 
instead of the present value of its future cash flows.  Many times when buying a business, the 
acquirer is really just buying the assets to start his own business.  This is particularly true in most 
service businesses.   
The purpose of this paper is to advocate reintroducing a qualification to the going concern 
audit opinion when an entity separate from its owner/manager does not exist.  Criteria for 
determination are also proposed.  Arguably, this will make audited accounting statements more 
meaningful for closely-held firms.   More important, this should produce information useful for 
potential creditors and outside owners.   Traditionally, banks have extended loans to small, 
closely-held firms with only compiled statements; there was no need to provide audited 
statements.  However, the process of lending is changing from a direct, face-to-face process 
between borrower and lender to an indirect one where credit scoring systems are used.  Audited 
statements can provide better, higher quality information to lenders extending credit.   
Though not necessarily related to going concern status, a similar situation exists with 
privately held firms having outside managers.  Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy (2000) have a 
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current working paper that finds executive compensation more closely related to sales than 
profitability in privately-held, small corporations.  Almost every compensation study, starting 
with Lewellen and Huntsman's (1970) work over thirty years ago, finds compensation more 
closely related to profitability than sales for public firms.  But all public firms have audited 
financial statements.  Very few small, closely-held firms produce them.   Since arguably, 
revenues are more difficult to manipulate than profits, compensation for these firms seems to be 
determined as a function of  revenues.  With outside managers in privately-held firms, audited 
statements would allow them to better assess performance to determine compensation and 
hopefully provide a better incentive to maximize shareholder value for the owners. 
While the FASB and the SEC have focused on public firms, accounting rules have 
become less relevant for closely-held businesses.  Creditors have learned to make lending 
decisions and outside owners have learned to evaluate performance without the benefit of audited 
financial statements.  Firms that could provide this attestation function have foregone a 
significant revenue stream.   Of course, major auditing firms are not affected as much because 
most small, closely-held businesses use local or regional accounting firms.  Ironically, at a time 
when major, high- profile firms are promoting competition to identify the best-run small 
businesses in local markets as possible sources of new revenue, they are not considering the 
importance of directing GAAP to provide useful information for these closely held firms.  It 
appears as if these large firms are moving from the traditional auditing function to focus on the 
more lucrative consulting business.  Conceptually, accountants are not providing all the 
information about the firm that they can; practically, accountants have forfeited their potential 
auditing business with non-public firms which they could reclaim.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  First we provide a review of GAAP 
as related to the going concern and entity principles and then a review of the current literature as 
related to these issues.  Next, an argument is made and data presented on why audited financial 
statements should be even more important today with changing lending practices.  We then 
suggest how GAAP could be revised to determine a going concern.  Finally, we discuss what is 
and is not a going concern under our criteria using an anecdotal example.                
 
I.  Current GAAP and Going Concern Status 
A.  Going Concern Definition 
The most recent pronouncements on what constitutes a going concern are found in the 
Statement on Auditing Standards, No. 59 (April 1988).  This authoritative reference provides 
guidance to the auditor conducting an audit of financial statements in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS).  It posits, in the second paragraph, that the auditor has 
“...responsibility to evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to 
continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed one year beyond the 
date of the financial statements being audited.”  It notes in paragraph 4, that “...the auditor is not 
responsible for predicting future conditions or events.”  Apparently, this safe harbor provision 
protects the auditor by noting that evaluation of a firm‟s going concern status is not the primary 
goal or objective of the audit.  Finally, note in paragraph 6, “Consideration of Conditions and 
Events”  where none of the topics covered relates to the owner/manager or any other key person 
leaving the firm.  Instead, it focuses on the usual problems that can cause a firm to discontinue 
operating due to poor performance.  
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Auditors, while aware of the going concern problem, never explicitly address the issue as 
it relates to a specific individual.  In searching traditional accounting literature, no information 
was found relating going concern status to either a “key individual” or a continuation of the 
current owner/manager.  Historically, accountants have found no reason to worry about what 
constitutes an “entity” when considering a going concern.  The emphasis is entirely on future 
performance.   
 
B.  Evidence on Going Concern Qualifications with Public Firms 
Accounting makes the going concern principle the basis for many measurement and 
valuation concepts such as the historical cost and revenue recognition assumptions.  Many 
studies have been undertaken to demonstrate the stock price effect of receiving a going concern 
qualification on the financial statements.  It appears to impart additional information to the 
market for both security pricing and predicting future activity such as bankruptcy or delisting.  
While these studies are all conducted on publicly-trade firms, one could expect similar inferences 
from a study of closely-held firms.      
Prior literature generally provides evidence that the going concern audit opinion provides 
an early warning signal.  Hopwood, McKeown and Mutchler (1989) find that the qualified going 
concern opinion provides incremental explanatory power in the context of a bankruptcy 
prediction model.  Kennedy and Shaw (1991) report that the qualified opinion is a significant 
variable in explaining bankruptcy resolution (i.e., whether a company which files for bankruptcy 
eventually liquidates or reorganizes).  Another aspect of this literature investigates possible 
reasons that underlie the auditor‟s error “on the other side.”  These studies consider the decision 
to issue a going concern opinion for a company that ultimately files bankruptcy (McKeown, 
Mutchler and Hopwood, 1991).  In this approach in a later article, Hopwood, McKeown and 
Mutchler (1994) find no evidence that auditor‟s qualified going concern opinions are inferior 
predictors of bankruptcy compared to traditional statistical models.  Nogler (1995) follows 
companies that receive qualified opinions through their resolution in terms of bankruptcy, 
liquidation, merger or subsequent receipt of an unqualified opinion.  He concludes the error rate 
quoted in the literature that results from incorrectly giving firms qualified opinions is too high.    
The broader question as to whether "subject to" audit qualifications provide information 
content to capital market participants is a long-standing, though unresolved, research issue in the 
financial accounting literature.  However, effective with SAS 58 (AIPCA 1988), the Auditing 
Standards Board eliminated the "subject to" audit opinion based, in part, on its view that it did 
not convey incremental information to financial statement users.  Arguably, it should be 
reinstated.  
Many studies examine whether the auditor‟s decision to modify his opinion in the 
presence of material uncertainties is correlated with stock returns over time.  They group together 
a variety of "subject to" audit opinions including asset realization, litigation concerns, as well as 
going concern issues.  The earlier papers in this literature find little support for the information 
content of these opinions (e.g., Ball, Walker and Whittred, 1979; Elliott, 1982; and Dodd, 
Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1984).  Subsequent literature suggests that these audit 
opinions affect stock returns in various contexts based upon whether the audit qualification 
receives media coverage (Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1986); whether the qualification is 
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withdrawn (Loudder, Khurana, Sawyers, Cordery, Lowe, and Wunderle, 1992); or whether the 
audit opinion dampens market reaction to subsequent earnings announcements (Choi and Jeter, 
1992).   
As noted by several of these authors, a variety of issues confound examination of the 
information content of these opinions.  Information content studies are basically empirical studies 
of association (i.e., statistical dependency) between various independent (explanatory) variables 
and stock price changes over some appropriate event window.  There are empirical problems in 
specifically identifying the event or announcement date with the release of accounting 
statements.  Then problems exist with concurrent news disclosures.  Finally, the absence of a 
suitable expectation model exists from which to discern the unexpected component of the 
qualification.  
Other papers focus only on the information content of the going concern opinion.  Firth 
(1978) finds for a sample of UK companies that the announcement of a qualified going concern 
opinion is associated with negative stock returns (though his results have never been replicated).  
 Fleak and Wilson (1994) find that unexpected qualified going concern opinions are associated 
with negative abnormal returns, but unexpected clean opinions do not produce positive abnormal 
returns.  Investigating both a qualified going concern report and subsequent bankruptcy (similar 
to Choi and Jeter‟s (1992) approach), Chen and Church (1996) report that the presence of 
qualified going concern status attenuates the market reaction to a subsequent bankruptcy filing.  
More recently Willenborg and McKeown (1998) consider going concern opinions with 
IPOs.  They find approximately one quarter of all IPOs under $10 million have going concern 
qualifications in their offering prospectus.  Building this information incrementally into their 
delisting model based upon other publicly available information, they find that the explanatory 
power of the extended model is significantly increased.  They also find that IPO firms with going 
concern opinions suffer less first-day underpricing than similar IPOs without going concern 
opinions.  They conclude that having a going concern opinion reduces ex ante uncertainty for 
investors.  Their work motivates consideration of a broader definition of going concern for 
closely-held firms.  
These studies suggest that a qualified going concern opinion provides value-relevant 
information for publicly traded firms.  We could find no literature dealing with going concern 
qualification in closely-held firms.  All published studies dealt with the results of specific events' 
(e.g., qualified opinions) effect on either the firm‟s stock price or subsequent bankruptcy or 
delisting.  While all are certainly logical research questions, research to date has failed to address 
the issue of whether the audit (qualification) process provides useful information for creditors of 
non-public firms.  Unfortunately, no insight is provided into the going concern problem that we 
posit: does a separate entity actually exist in a closely held enterprise and how can it be 
recognized.  We therefore consider some original research into whether others view separate 
going concerns with closely-held firms. 
 
II.  Going Concern Status of Closely Held Firms: A Lender's Perspective  
Closely held firms rarely have audited financial statements.  However, all banks lend 
money to these firms, suppliers extend credit to them, and obviously employees work for them.  
All without caring whether a separate going concern actually exists.  This occurs, in good part, 
because of no well-defined going concern concept for small, closely-held firms.  In not 
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considering that issue, accountants have defaulted on their responsibility to provide any 
meaningful information about these firms' ability to survive in the future.   
The standard argument for small firm owners when asked about audited financial 
statements is why bother, lenders don‟t care.  But lenders do care.  They almost always require 
that owner/managers personally co-sign loan agreements.  After the owner/manager has 
established a successful relationship with the lender, usually five to ten years later, new loans 
will be made requiring only the “firm” to sign.  Traditional finance arguments suggest agency 
problems.  The firm could shift risk after borrowing the funds or it could just forego positive net 
present value investments by paying the money out to the owner/manager.  While repeated 
success with a customer definitely attests to his/her character, adverse incentives still remain.  
However, after several successful loans, the firm has matured and now represents a going 
concern to the bank.  Any adverse incentive problems are with respect to the business and not its 
owner/managers.  Thus, the personal co-sign requirement is typically no longer necessary. 
Direct evidence on going concern status is not available.  However evidence is available on 
lenders‟ requirements for borrowers.  Specifically, we can view the portion of firms whose 
owners are required to personally guarantee borrowing agreements.  Overall, we find that a 
significantly higher portion of firms with owner/managers are required to give personal 
guarantees than are small firms with outside professional managers.  Obviously, under our 
definition of going concern, these would almost all qualify as separate entities.  Secondly, we 
find that older firms also have a lower portion of loans where personal guarantees are required.  
These firms are more likely to have established themselves as separate going concerns 
independent of their owner/managers. 
Data we examine are taken from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance that 
was jointly undertaken by the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Small Business 
Administration.  It provides detailed information on the types and sources of financial services 
used by small businesses with emphasis on the use of credit.  It contains information on collateral 
including personal guarantees being required by the owners.  The firms are also categorized by 
type (proprietorship, partnership, corporation, and Subchapter  S corporation) along with age and 
other variables.    A good review of this data can be found in Cole and Wolken (1995).        
We consider only regular or “C” corporations because proprietorships and partnerships are 
not really going concerns by almost any definition.  A more difficult classification decision arose 
for Subchapter S corporations.  We felt that these firms, almost as large in number as “C” 
corporations, do not really represent going concerns because of their limited number of 
shareholders and the unanimous agreement required by shareholders to qualify as a Subchapter S. 
However, it should be noted that we also examined the data including all corporations and 
obtained qualitatively similar results. 
We investigate the hypothesis that lenders can identify going concerns and are less likely to 
require owners' personal guarantees on loans.  The first characteristic that would qualify a small 
corporation as a going concern is having an outside manager.  There were 2662 loans reported as 
“C” corporations.  Coincidentally, exactly half or 1332 had owners‟ personal guarantees.  
However, for the 1949 owner/manager firms, 52.2% had personal guarantees while the remaining 
713 firms with outside managers had only 44% with personal guarantees.  Under the hypothesis 
of equal means, a binomial test indicates a significantly greater portion of loans to 
owner/manager firms required personal guarantees. 
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Our next test looks at whether the age of the firms makes a difference.  We investigate the 
hypothesis that older firms are more likely to be going concerns.  Over time, stakeholders start to 
identify more with the firm than its owner.  For owner/manager firms, only 1142 loans are from 
firms reporting an age of greater than 10 years.  Of these, 581 (or 50.9%) require personal 
guarantees.  For the younger firms‟ 807 loans, 437 (or 54.2%) require the guarantee.  While this 
difference is not as great as that between insider and outside management, it is still significantly 
different.  Thus, consistent with our suggestion, it appears lenders are currently capable of 
identifying going concerns.   
Why should accountants worry whether or not a going concern exists?  The attestation 
function basically confirms that financial statements are fairly and consistently presented.  
Potential lenders use this data to assess risk in order to make informed financing decisions.  
Smaller firms rarely produce audited financial statements unless required.  In cases of no audit, 
the financier must develop his own criteria for determining the going concern status and credit 
worthiness of the applicant. 
The importance of accurate, relevant, and timely financial information can be expected to 
grow over time.  Traditionally, small firms developed a close relationship with their banker that 
lasts for years.  Bankers accumulate private information on these closely held firms that allowed 
them to make informed decisions.  Closely held firms obtain financing without having to disclose 
their financial data to the public.  However these relationships are changing now. With the recent 
merger activity in the banking industry, the small, closely-held firm finds its "personal" banker 
continuously changing.  Banks routinely transfer managers from branch to branch making long 
term relationships built on trust and private information more difficult to maintain.  Conversely, 
smaller firms, for their part, are now more likely to have less loyalty to their banker and more 
likely to shop around to obtain the best loan terms.  The use of objective and verifiable 
information that includes audited financial statements will become more important. 
Loan shopping reaches its extreme with the uniform conditions for granting small 
business loans.  Wells Fargo has a program to extend $100,000 of credit to closely held firm 
owners through a standard application form somewhat similar to a car loan application.  Forms 
are credit scored and the loan decision is made automatically.  The securitization or pooling of 
loans to small businesses is also becoming common.  For this line of business to expand and 
reach its potential requires reliable and consistent data.  Arguably, this will require identifying 
which firms are really separate going concerns and which are merely extensions of their 
owner/manager entrepreneurs.  Again, a clearer line in establishing what is a going concern 
becomes relevant. 
       In a recent paper related to small firm business lending, Petersen and Rajan (2000) 
look at the "distance" of small firm borrowers from their lenders.  Using the same National 
Survey of Small Business Finance data, they found small firms are now significantly further in 
geographic proximity from their sources of funds.  They point out that informational 
transparency, or the ability to evaluate the firm‟s credit quality at low cost, will lower the cost of 
lending to the firm.  We feel that audited financial statements are one way to provide certified 
information to lenders.  This data can be interpreted with confidence with respect to its accuracy 
and fairness. Further, it does not necessitate physical visits or personal contacts by the lender that 
would traditionally be required as due diligence for loans to small, closely-held firms.  The 
federal government is one lender that has historically required audited financial statements before 
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making loans.  In programs like the Small Business Administration (SBA), higher accounting 
standards are enforced.  Further, the SBA is aware of the weakness in the going concern 
verification for small firms.  They require owners on any equity position to co-sign the loan; not 
just the principal owners required in private arrangements.  This requirement and the senior 
position of their debt greatly restricts firms' financing options; particularly their ability to 
undertake additional financing in the future.  As an aside, the government guaranteed portion of 
these loans, typically 80% of the amount borrowed, is already being securitized and resold.  It is 
entirely likely that the other 20% will be pooled and also sold in the future.  
 
III.  Does A Going Concern Exist? 
When valuing closely held firms, the first consideration is whether a separate “going 
concern” actually exists.  For a large firm, going concern refers to whether the entity is solvent 
and can continue to exist in the immediate future as currently structured.  With a closely held 
firm, emphasis is changed from potential survivability in the future to whether an independent 
business exists that is separate or separable from its current owner/managers.  Thus, the relevant 
issue becomes whether the current business can continue to exist with a significant change in 
ownership.  In many cases, closely held firms are not separate entities from their owners.  The 
business is merely an extension of the entrepreneur or person who developed the entity or “firm” 
over time.  It most likely is structured as a separate firm for legal and/or tax reasons.  However, 
with a change in ownership, a different business may emerge.  Prior to the owner/manager being 
replaced, it can be very difficult to determine whether a separate business exists, but such a 
determination is required to know how the business should be valued.  
The following two criteria are posited for a closely held firm to be considered a separate, 
on-going entity from its current owner/managers.  First, will the firm continue to operate as it is 
currently structured if the current owner/manager is replaced?  That is, if the owner were 
replaced, would there truly be a continuity of business or would a new business be formed using 
the old assets.  Many small firm sales are really the restructuring of old assets into a new 
enterprise.   You purchase a farm to become a farmer, a cab medallion to become a taxi driver, or 
a seat on the stock exchange to become a trader.  These are all new businesses that require 
specific assets to enter the field.  These assets are basically sellable property rights and do not 
represent specific ongoing businesses.   
The second test considers the perspective of the various stakeholders that deal with the 
business.  Do the customers or suppliers view themselves as dealing with the business or with its 
current owners?  For example, consider an accounting business.   An independent accountant has 
her firm name on the door, Small Business Solutions, Joan Smith, CPA.   She has an office staff 
and several junior people working for her. This business is merely an extension of Joan.  She 
may, in fact, have valuable assets to sell when she retires, including her current customer list and 
a well trained staff and organization.  However, the new buyers must establish themselves as a 
going concern.  Clients probably would consider their new accountant to be a different firm even 
if the same name were retained.  Contrast this with a large firm.  Assume that your accountant is 
Arthur Andersen.  While you may deal with a specific individual, you know that when he or she 
leaves, their replacement will be of similar quality (education, training, and experience).  Further, 
users of your financial statements look at Arthur Andersen to establish credibility and not the 
specific partner who signs the statements.  One reason the market is willing to pay a higher rate 
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for Big 5 assurance services is because users of their financial statements know the firm and its 
reputation and do not have to consider the quality and integrity of the individual accountant.   
If a firm passes both tests, it should be valued as an ongoing business.  Even though 
changes will be made in the firm after it is sold, the valuation process should start by evaluating 
current cash flows and assuming that the enterprise will continue into the future even if 
operations are conducted by new individuals and under new leadership/management.      
A firm failing to pass either test should be valued instead as the sum of the specific assets 
being sold.  These assets could be either tangible or intangible.   In rural areas, farmland is priced 
for its location (bottomland or upland) by the acre.  Similarly, specific intangible assets such as a 
cab medallion or a seat on a security exchange are also priced differently depending on city 
location or stock exchange.  Quite often, current prices are published in local newspapers.  These 
are identifiable specific assets.  
Conceptually similar, but more difficult to measure, is buying a service business such as a 
medical, legal, accounting, or consulting practice.  What is actually being acquired?  An existing 
office, some staff, or possibly just some used equipment.  But what is really being paid for is the 
chance to see and hopefully impress most of the current customers once.  If they do not like you, 
they will shop elsewhere.  You and your expertise are the product.  This is why you cannot value 
the business as a going concern.   
 
IV.  Real Examples of Going Concern Determination  
The previous examples were meant to suggest straightforward decisions.  The actual 
distinction between a going concern and a non-going concern can be somewhat arbitrary.  For 
that matter, the delineation between a going concern and a self-employed entrepreneur is also 
murky.  One purpose of this paper is to flag the importance of making a going concern 
determination based upon more than the future profitability of old owners.  In the next section, 
some real examples of what is and what is not a going concern are provided.  Then an example of 
a business that at first glance would appear to be a going concern but, in fact, turns out not to be, 
is provided. 
A.  The CEO is Important But Not the Entire Factor 
Ford Motor Company is obviously a going concern even though the Ford family controls 
40% of the voting stock and their chairman of the board is William Clayton Ford, Jr., who is the 
founder‟s great grandson.  Similarly, consider a newer firm whose founder‟s name is not on the 
door: Microsoft and Bill Gates.  If Mr. Gates suddenly dies from a car accident, the market value 
of the company Microsoft would undoubtedly suffer.  Does this mean that Microsoft is not a 
going concern?  Of course not.  It just shows that Mr. Gates is a highly valued, key employee.  
Or, what about Mike Bloomberg who controls the privately held Bloomberg News Service?  
While his demise would cause great problems, one would still consider Bloomberg News as a 
going concern.   
Moving along the continuum to a more personal relationship, consider Lutece, a four star 
restaurant in New York City, owned by Andre Soltner.   Recently, a valuation was undertaken for 
a possible sale.  The valuation was done two ways:  with and  without Mr. Soltner continuing on 
as chief chef.  Since customers of a restaurant of this caliber view the chef as the major 
determinant of its quality, it becomes questionable whether a going concern exists without him.  
This relevant accounting issue is not just whether the current owner/manager is valuable to the 
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business, but whether the business is separable or even capable of being valued without him. 
   One test that is not considered in determining a going concern is how it's actually 
organized legally.  The current owner/managers organize their firms to minimize certain types of 
costs.  These include transaction costs to establish the business, its potential liability exposure, 
and the joint firm and individual tax exposure.  While most proprietorships and regular 
partnerships would not qualify as going concerns under our definition, others would.  This would 
include many Limited Liability Companies (LLCs), or in some states, Limited Liability 
Partnerships (LLPs).  Most LLCs both have a limited life (30 year maximum) and are 
reorganized if there is an ownership change.  LLCs can be taxed as either a corporation or a 
partnership.  Some are going concerns under our criteria while others are not.  Conversely, many 
small corporations are merely the extension of the owner/manager‟s self-employment.  
Conceptually, the corporate form has a continuous life, but for valuation purposes most small 
closely held corporations should be viewed as facing a finite investment horizon. 
B.  Florida Retirement Lifestyles and the Going Concern 
What happened to Florida Retirement Lifestyles provides a good example of what 
constitutes a going concern under our definition.  As Hoffman (1998) reported, about 30 years 
after its founding in 1946, Dyeann and Richard Dummer purchased what became Florida 
Retirement Lifestyles.  Starting in the mid-1970's, Florida became an extremely popular place for 
people to retire.  Mobile Home Living, which was the magazine‟s original name, evolved into 
Florida Retirement Lifestyles.  It was riding the crest of that trend.  Despite some lean times, the 
Dummers have converted a weekly tabloid into a glossy magazine that appears 10 times a year.     
In July 1996, they produced their banner issue for the 50,000-circulation voice of the 
Sunshine State‟s retirement community.   The 86 pages featured a home-buying guide for retirees 
and brimmed with real-estate ads.  More importantly, it generated almost $100,000 in revenues 
which was a record for a single issue according to the Dummers.  The demographic trend in the 
burgeoning retirement population points to continued growth for the publication and even greater 
revenues in the future. 
Is this magazine a going concern under our definition, or merely an extension of the 
Dummers?  First, can one expect the business to continue as it is currently structured if the 
owner/manager is replaced?  It appears as if this firm could continue without much interruption.  
It has been in business over 50 years and has already gone through one change of ownership.  
Second, do customers (and other stakeholders) view their interactions with the business, or 
magazine, as dealing with the firm or with the Dummers?  The purchasers of the magazine buy it 
for content not because of who publishes it.  Similarly, advertisers consider the audience of the 
magazine and not the specific publisher, when they purchase advertising space. 
The potential of this magazine also caught the attention of William A. Campbell, then 55, 
who had recently relocated near Fort Lauderdale.  While previously a financial planner with no 
publishing experience, Campbell saw great potential in the magazine business.  He spotted a 
favorable demographic trend in the growing retirement population and purchased the magazine 
from the Dummers for an undisclosed sum.  Campbell integrated Florida Retirement Lifestyles 
with two other smaller publications he had bought earlier, hoping to lower overall expenses such 
as circulation and accounting. 
The issue, from our perspective, is whether Campbell bought a going concern in Florida 
Retirement Lifestyles or just a title (and circulation list) to make into his own magazine.  The 
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going concern classification is most important at the time of a major financing and/or ownership 
change.  One indication that the transaction involved a going concern was that the magazine‟s 
editor continued on with the new owner, Campbell.  He was very encouraged as Campbell 
upgraded the journalistic standards of the magazine, disdaining “puff pieces.”  Campbell also 
spent heavily on graphics and content assuming that improved quality would increase the sale of 
advertising space which was the primary source of revenues. 
Changing a business after its purchase does not, by itself, indicate it was or was not a 
going concern.  What matters is various parties‟ perspectives at the time of a restructuring or 
sale.  In this business, the major stakeholders were employees and advertisers.  While the 
employees were content with the change, advertisers had reservations.  The Dummers, who were 
no longer involved with the business, were outstanding salespeople.  They had produced a 
product that pleased their advertisers.  However, the key to determining the going concern status 
of this business is neither the Dummers' sales talents nor Campbell‟s strategic decisions.  The key 
is what the stakeholders thought.  In an Inc. magazine article, Steve Wallschlaeger, general 
manager of the retirement community Hacienda Del Rio in Edgewater, Florida, states…  “We‟ve 
known the Dummers for years.  When they left, the magazine left with them.”  It is not surprising 
that advertising revenues dropped way off.  As a result, if Mr. Wallschlaeger‟s view is a 
representative quote, no going concern existed with this magazine when it changed hands.        
One year to the month after the banner issue that initially caught Campbell‟s attention, his 
publishing business filed for bankruptcy.  The business reported assets of $98,089 and liabilities 
of $557,712.  Two months later, Campbell filed personal bankruptcy owing more that $800,000 
to 32 creditors.  His largest single debt was owed to the Dummers who had financed his purchase 
of their magazine.  If the business had been identified as a non-going concern and was viewed as 
inseparable from its owners, it is quite likely Mr. Campbell would have considered the purchase 
more carefully and quite possibly avoided bankruptcy.   
While anecdotal, these stylized facts for a closely held business and its purchase highlight 
issues that must be considered before making a major financing or acquisition decision.  
Obviously, every situation will be different.  However, specific rules to determine a going 
concern, while difficult to articulate, are not impossible to establish.  
 
V. Conclusions 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) apply to more than just publicly 
traded firms.  Further, information's relevance should be measured by more than security market 
price  reactions.  The growing financial markets for lending are now securitizing loans for small, 
closely held firms.  Lenders and borrowers are further separated geographically than ever before 
making personal visits by lenders more difficult if not problematic.  Audited accounting 
statements could provide important information in that process.  However, this would require a 
change in standard-setting trends for GAAP as well as the attitudes of accounting firms towards 
this possible new area for business generation. 
As a neglected criteria in this shift, we consider the going concern principle.  As it now 
stands going concern status is based entirely on a firm‟s ability to continue existence as it is 
currently operating.  No thought is given as to whether a going concern would even exist if a 
sudden change in its principle owner/manager occurred.  This is obviously an important piece of 
critical information for potential creditors.  We propose two criteria to determine whether a 
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separate going concern exists.  Will the firm continue to exist if its owner/manager is replaced?  
Do customers and other stakeholders view themselves as dealing with a separate entity or just the 
owner/manager?  Reinstating a going concern qualification in the attestation process, especially 
for small, closely-held firms, will provide useful information for potential creditors and shed 
light on this contentious valuation issue.   
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